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The Federal Reserve is an unusual organiza-
tion in a number of respects. One peculiarity is
that I can take positions that are not 100 percent
aligned with those of the Fed Chairman. During
the late 1960s and early 1970s, St. Louis Fed
President Darryl Francis was in pretty open rebel-
lion, actively and publicly opposing policy posi-
tions taken by the two Fed Chairman who served
while Francis was president. More generally,
members of the Federal Open Market Committee
can, and on occasion do, publicly dissent from the
majority position, which has always been defined
by the position of the Fed Chairman. I hasten to
add that I feel very fortunate that I am serving
underaFedChairmanIhaveknownandrespected
since the early 1970s, and with whom any differ-
ences are the typical professional disagreements
over details and not over fundamentals.
Still, can you imagine an officer of a private-
sector company publicly dissenting from a deci-
sion taken by the Chairman of the board? Standard
practice is to argue your case internally, but defi-
nitely not externally, and then to fall in line with
whatever decision the CEO makes. In fact, the
Federal Reserve is not fundamentally different in
this respect. At the end of the day, there can be
only one monetary policy; although I may dissent
publicly, and believe I have an obligation to dis-
sent if I feel strongly enough, I also have the
responsibility to support the monetary policy
decisions of the FOMC.
One lesson I draw from these observations is
that I have been able to make this career transition
successfully—at least from my perspective—
I
appreciate comments provided by my col-
leagues, especially Robert Rasche, Director
of Research, at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. I take full responsibility for
errors. The views expressed are mine and do
not necessarily reflect official positions of the
Federal Reserve System.
Since coming to the St. Louis Fed four and a
half years ago, a number of people have asked
me about how that move happened and how my
new career direction has worked out. In thinking
about a speech topic for today, it struck me that
reflecting on my transition from professor to
policymaker might fit especially well in the con-
text of the Executive MBA program of the Olin
School. I’m certainly not the only one to have
made a right-angle change in career direction,
and some of you may already have had a similar
experience.
Although I’ll not have much to say in my
prepared remarks about current monetary policy,
I would not be surprised if you ask me about this
subject when I finish speaking. So, I will offer
the standard Federal Reserve disclaimer, that I’m
speaking for myself and that my views do not
necessarily represent official Federal Reserve
positions.
What I want to do is talk a bit about how I
got to St. Louis, how my years as a university
professor are relevant to what I do now, and the
intellectual connections between my life as pro-
fessor and my life as policymaker. I particularly
want to discuss one specific aspect of policymak-
ing: the important role of clear communication
with the markets and general public.because I knew the Federal Reserve quite well
before assuming my current position. That knowl-
edge stemmed from my employment on the staff
of the Board of Governors for four years in the
early 1970s; a year on the staff of, and several
years consulting for, the Boston Fed; and my
research on monetary policy issues as a univer-
sity professor. Moreover, and this is where the
“shadow” reference in my title comes from, I was
a member of the Shadow Open Market Committee
from 1985 to the time I came to St. Louis in 1998.
The SOMC is a group of academic and business
economists that meets twice a year to discuss
macroeconomic policy issues and to present their
conclusions to the press. Consequently, through
my years of research, teaching, and my involve-
ment with the SOMC and a number of other pro-
fessional activities, I was quite familiar with
monetary policy issues and their history. If you
are going to make a career change, you are well
advised to know a lot about the organization you
are about to join and about the issues you are
about to face.
Even so, I had no experience as the CEO of an
organization as large as the St. Louis Fed, which
has about 1,300 employees. Two brief stints as
economics department chairman at Brown
University did little to prepare me to lead the
Bank. So, I had a lot to learn when I arrived here.
Another peculiarity of a Federal Reserve
Bank is that there is no real understudy position
to prepare a candidate to be Bank president. As
you know, there are 12 Reserve Banks; some of
the presidents have extensive managerial experi-
ence, either in the Federal Reserve System or the
private sector, and others have an extensive mone-
tary policy background, as I did. But no one comes
into the job with the full range of experience
across all the different responsibilities of a Reserve
Bank president. I was fortunate to inherit a strong
senior staff to run the operating side of the Bank
and that has permitted me to concentrate on my
comparative advantage, which is monetary policy.
Nevertheless, during my years in St. Louis, I’ve
learned a lot about all the various responsibili-
ties of the Bank and have become increasingly
involved in all aspects of the Bank’s operations.
I’ve also taken a growing role in System-wide
activities affecting all the Reserve Banks. These
totally new areas for me have been challenging
and very rewarding personally as I’ve learned
the ropes and have been able to make some con-
tributions beyond the subject matter I knew pretty
well when I arrived.
When my predecessor informed the St. Louis
board of directors of his intention to resign, the
board began the search process for a new presi-
dent. One consideration was that the board
wanted, if possible, to find a monetary policy
expert whose views were consistent with the
policy tradition of the St. Louis Fed. That tradition
began in the 1950s, when Homer Jones became
research director. Jones brought the University
of Chicago school of monetary economics to the
Bank, and those views later became the focus of
intense policy debate. Within the Federal Reserve,
Darryl Francis led the Chicago school side of the
argument.
MY PROFESSORIAL LIFE
My professional training in economics was
at the University of Chicago in the early 1960s.
At that time, after roughly 30 years of neglect, the
subject areas of monetary economics and mone-
tary policy became highly controversial. The dom-
inant professional paradigm that emerged from
the Great Depression of the 1930s was based on
the work of John Maynard Keynes in his General
Theory and the work of economists who followed
Keynes and further developed his ideas.
One of those ideas was that the federal govern-
ment could, and should, stabilize short-run fluc-
tuations in economic activity through the active
application of fiscal policy—timely changes in
government spending and taxes. Government was
expected to moderate, and if you were an optimist,
eliminate the business cycle. In the United States,
the federal government became committed to
such a policy objective by the Employment Act
of 1946.
A second central Keynesian idea was that
monetary policy was irrelevant or nearly so.
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Treasury Accord in 1951, the Fed was committed
to a policy of pegging nominal interest rates at
low levels to minimize the interest costs of the
large Federal debt accumulated during World
War II. In this regime, the Fed was nothing more
than a price controller. After 1951, the Fed was
relieved of its narrow mandate, but the principal
objective of monetary policy—to keep nominal
interest rates low and stable—remained. The Fed’s
role in, or responsibility for, inflation was not on
the radar screen in most policy discussions of
the late 1950s and early 1960s.
So, I came to graduate study at Chicago at a
time when Chicago economists, especially Milton
Friedman, were conducting a frontal assault on
what was then mainstream macroeconomics—
the received Keynesian wisdom. Friedman was
involved in a number of research projects, but
perhaps the most important was his work, with
co-author Anna J. Schwartz, on A Monetary
History of the United States 1867-1960.1 This
monumental study was published in 1963. The
book covered a lot of ground, but perhaps the
single most important topic concerned the propo-
sition that monetary policy mistakes turned what
might have been a minor recession into the Great
Depression. Given the prevailing Keynesian wis-
dom, those were indeed fighting words.
As a graduate student, I studied papers just
published and papers in prepublication form
presented in research workshops, especially
Friedman’s Money Workshop. Along with other
Chicago graduate students, I was an inside
observer of the frontiers of the monetary econom-
ics debate. In 1976, Friedman was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Economics, in part for his work in
monetary history and theory. It is exciting to me
even today to look back on my Chicago years and
realize that I was there at such an important
time.
Although I took lots of economics courses
and was a member of the Money Workshop, my
home base at Chicago was actually the graduate
school of business and I received my Ph.D. from
that school. Pathbreaking work at Chicago was
not confined to the economics department. There
was exciting research proceeding at the business
school as well—what later came to be called the
efficient markets theory of financial markets. This
work fit in naturally with the broader Chicago
school tradition of respect for competitive markets
and distrust of government intervention. Such
intervention was based on the incorrect view that
markets are often, or even typically, inefficient and
irrational. A growing body of empirical research,
much of it from Chicago, demonstrated that mar-
kets were not the irrational casinos that so many
thought they were. One of my thesis advisors
was Merton Miller, who won the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1990 for his work in finance.
These themes from my graduate school days,
of the importance of monetary policy and respect
for the efficiency of markets, motivated much of
my research and teaching during my years in
academia.
MY POLICYMAKER LIFE
By the time I arrived at the St. Louis Fed in
1998, the policy environment was remarkably
different from what it had been in the 1960s and
1970s. At least the way I see it, most of the issues
monetary economists fought over in the 1960s
had been resolved in favor of positions espoused
by Milton Friedman and others who led the devel-
opment of the Chicago approach to monetary
economics.
As academic views changed, so also did the
views of central banks. I know of no central banker
today who does not subscribe to Friedman’s dic-
tum that “sustained inflation is everywhere and
always a monetary phenomenon.” Central banks
today emphasize their responsibility for control-
ling inflation, and some have made that commit-
ment clear by adopting an explicit inflation target.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand proved to be
the pacesetter when, in 1991 in concert with a
Labor government, it accepted a single policy
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1 Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).responsibility, namely, to hit a prespecified quan-
titative inflation target. Since then, “inflation
targeting” has been specified as the policy objec-
tive for a large number of central banks, including
the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the
Swedish RiksBank, and the Central Banks of Chile
and Brazil and the Bank of Korea, to name a few.
There is another aspect of changing central
bank practice that is much less complete and
much less understood—the growth of central
bank transparency. Around the world, central
bankers have been abandoning their traditional
preoccupation with secrecy in favor of a policy
environment with transparent objectives and
substantial disclosure of the rationale for policy
actions. However, there are many unresolved




During the 1970s, a key development was
the construction of rational expectations macro-
economic models. Research on efficient markets
at Chicago and elsewhere and theoretical insights
from economists such as Robert Lucas, who won
the Nobel Prize in 1995 for this work, made clear
that it was impossible to model the behavior of
the private sector without incorporating market
expectations about all relevant information,
including the course of monetary policy. That
meant that a satisfactory outcome for the economy
depended not only on the central bank following
a sound policy but also on the central bank mak-
ing clear what the policy was. Otherwise, the
economy might suffer the equivalent of a broken
play in football, where the line believes the quar-
terback is calling one play when the backfield is
running a different play. If markets believe the
central bank is pursuing a different policy than
it intends, both the markets and the central bank
will probably suffer nasty surprises.
Academic model builders solved this problem
by assumption. To solve a rational expectations
model, all that was necessary was to write down
the equation describing monetary policy and
assume that the markets knew what that equation
was.
Before coming to St. Louis, I knew, as did other
academics, that no such monetary equation, or
monetary rule, existed. But I did not understand
the full import of this observation. When I got
to St. Louis, I immediately began to struggle to
explain monetary policy to audiences that had
invited me to speak. I had to field questions from
the press. Moreover, I became increasingly inter-
ested in the fact that the federal funds futures
market seemed to be able to predict FOMC policy
decisions with great accuracy. Those observations
encouraged me to think more systematically about
communications issues and to begin to conduct
research in this area. With an excellent research
staff at the Bank, and finding some interest among
our economists in what I was thinking about, we
began to uncover some fascinating evidence on
how the process works. We devoted the Bank’s
annual research conference to this subject in 2001.
The title of the conference was, “Getting the
Markets In Synch with Monetary Policy”; the
Bank has published the conference proceedings,
which are available in hard copy and on the St.
Louis Fed web site.
Let me go beyond my simple analogy of the
broken play in football to discuss just how impor-
tant this topic is. The FOMC, at each meeting, sets
a target for the federal funds rate, which is the
overnight rate between banks that borrow or lend
funds on a temporary basis. All other interest
rates are linked to the federal funds rate through
market expectations. The rate on a 1-month
Treasury bill depends on the market’s expecta-
tions of the federal funds rate over the next month;
the long-term mortgage rate similarly depends on
market expectations of the average one-day rate
over the life of the mortgage. These expectations
depend on the interaction of monetary policy and
the economy—all the influences that combine to
determine rates of interest. For just one example
of why this matter is important, consider the
mortgage rate, which is critically important for the
strength of the housing industry. That rate does
depend in part on expectations of future monetary
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air, but are dependent on how the Fed conducts
monetary policy and communicates its strategy.
How can the Federal Reserve most effectively
and accurately convey to the market its monetary
policy expectations and plans? This is not an easy
question, for many reasons. Policy interacts with
what is going on in the economy, and we must
talk about probabilities rather that certainties.
Inputs to our thinking include highly abstract
economic theory, statistical theory, gut feelings
about what is going on, and views about how best
to react to contingencies that may arise. How do
we convey this knowledge, and our recognition
of its incompleteness, to the markets and the
general public?
My thinking on these issues is still evolving.
To my mind, improving our understanding of how
best to communicate with the markets is a press-
ing monetary policy problem, because increasing
the stability of the economy probably depends
on making progress on this front. Let me offer a
few thoughts, with the understanding that these
are reflections subject to development and cer-
tainly reflections that should not in any way be
considered official Federal Reserve views.
I think it is very important to concentrate
first on clear communication of policy decisions
and their rationale, and not to attempt to convey
the full range of debate in real time. For one thing,
internal debate will be stifled if positions and
the names of persons holding those positions are
released promptly to the press or presented live
on C-SPAN. Televising FOMC meetings will not
disclose debate, but change it and interfere with
the free exchange of ideas. Moreover, would it
really help markets to better forecast policy direc-
tion if everyone knew all the details of a minority
position held by only one FOMC member? If you
are interested in this subject, I would urge you to
read the published transcripts of past FOMC meet-
ings, which the Fed releases with a five-year lag.
These transcripts serve an important function in
promoting accountability and providing a record
for economic historians; however, even assuming
that real-time TV did not change the debate I do
not think that such detailed knowledge would
help markets to price securities more efficiently.
The issue, I think, is how the FOMC can best
explain its policy decisions. The explanation is
important at any time, but even more important
is the regularity of decisions over time. That reg-
ularity defines a predictable policy. Creating that
regularity and the market’s understanding of it is
a crucial aspect of the explanation of each indi-
vidual policy decision. Policy regularity in turn is
what permits the market to predict decisions in
advance, based on the fundamentals that drive
the decisions. In fact, Robert Rasche, research
director at the Bank, and I explored this issue
fairly systematically in a paper we published in
2000.2
Consider the policy statement released by
the FOMC at the conclusion of each meeting.
Meeting minutes, speeches, and testimony con-
tain the same principal elements, but obviously
at much greater length. The policy statement con-
tains the policy decision and several other ele-
ments. One element is information on the Fed’s
view of the current state of the economy, its likely
future direction and risks. Obviously, this infor-
mation is highly relevant to the justification for
the policy decision determining the intended
federal funds rate.
A second element is information on the likely
or possible future direction of policy. How to deal
with this element is a difficult issue. Ordinarily,
it seems to me, if the FOMC is certain that it will
want to adjust the funds rate at its next meeting,
then it would be better advised to simply make
the entire adjustment at the meeting in question.
It makes no practical difference to the rate on a
10-year Treasury bond whether the federal funds
rate is changed by, say, 25 basis points at a partic-
ular meeting or at the next meeting in six weeks.
Usually, though, the intended federal funds
rate set at a particular meeting reflects the FOMC’s
best judgment as to the appropriate rate given
the information available at the meeting, and
judgments about future changes in the rate are
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2 “Perfecting the Market’s Knowledge of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 18 (December 2000), pp. 241-54.probabilistic. We know that information that
changes the picture may arise before the next
meeting. How can I convey to the market that I
think that the probability of a change at the next
meeting is 0.5, or 0.2, or whatever? Can the FOMC
as a committee, with members holding different
assessments of the probabilities, come to a com-
mon view and convey a committee decision on
this issue? Clearly, I am skeptical that this is a
productive avenue of communication. Frankly,
when I first came to the Fed in 1998 and the FOMC
was using the policy “bias” or “tilt” language in
its policy statement, I thought that the language
could serve a useful purpose. The more I have
reflected on the problem of clear communication
of policy intention, the more skeptical I have
become that such communication can be helpful.
What I think is quite clear, and more impor-
tant to explaining the policy process to the mar-
kets, is that whatever may be our assessment of
probabilities of future action, new information
may drive a change in that assessment. The mar-
kets should not believe that we will fail to act on
new information just because previous informa-
tion had led us in a different direction.
The problem is to explain what sort of new
information drives such reassessments. I wish I
could say more than “I know it when I see it.”
That is not a satisfactory response, but to date I
do not know how to formalize this process. If
someone did, we could write down a policy rule
linking policy actions to observable data. But
that is exactly what we cannot do at present.
A third element in the policy statement may
involve—and I emphasize “may”—an effort to
shape public perceptions of the state of the econ-
omy, to encourage a sense of greater optimism,
or suggest a need for greater caution.
I emphasize “may” with regard to an effort to
shape public psychology because my view is that
efforts in this direction that do not accord with the
Fed’s own view about the situation are unlikely
to be successful. If a policy statement exudes
optimism, and new data arriving over subsequent
weeks then suggest that the optimism was unwar-
ranted, any psychological effect will be short-
lived. I followed events pretty closely in the 1970s,
and believe that the Fed’s efforts, and efforts by
several national administrations, to defuse infla-
tionary psychology were not only unsuccessful
but also harmful to the government’s credibility.
We cannot fix an economic problem by talking
people out of it; we must instead work to get the
fundamentals right. In some cases, there is noth-
ing the government, or the Fed, can do about a
problem in the short run except wait patiently for
the problem to be resolved by market processes.
If the policy fundamentals are right and we
are right in our longer-run assessments of how
the economy will perform, then in due time the
data will support us and public views will change.
It can be painful to go month after month with
public psychology seemingly at odds with eco-
nomic reality, and as I reflect on living through
several such periods I know that the apparent
disconnect between fundamentals and psychology
makes me question my own assessments. My
strategy in such situations is to keep searching to
see how pieces of evidence fit together, and
whether they continue to confirm my beliefs or
lead me to change my beliefs. I do the best I can
to explain my beliefs, but try not to change public
psychology to be more optimistic than I myself
feel. That is the point I’m emphasizing—that
efforts to change psychology to manufacture a
happy outcome are, I think, rarely successful.
One final point. Analysts read between the
lines of what I write. I write knowing that analysts
read between the lines. Analysts know that I know
they are reading between the lines and write
accordingly. Given this infinite regress, I actually
try to write as plainly and simply and directly as
I know how. I try not to write using code words,
or words subject to misinterpretation because the
usage of a word in economics discourse differs
from ordinary English usage. I think the cause of
clear communication is served by careful writing
and by accumulation of trust over time between
writers and readers. I’ve come to know a handful
of journalists who follow my speeches; from my
perspective, I believe that my communication
through them is effective in the sense that they
accurately report what I say and convey the
intent of what I am saying in reports that are
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I have no doubt that my years of teaching
and writing have helped me to communicate
effectively in this sense. Thus, although I said at
the outset of my remarks today that my career
has taken a right-angle turn, in fact, there is far
more continuity in what I do now with my pro-
fessor years than might appear at first glance.
I’ll finish by saying that I find my job nonstop
fascinating, challenging, and never boring or
tiresome. I’ve been successful in following the
advice I always gave to my students—find a job
where someone will pay you to do something
you really love.
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